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A MINOR HAZARD: SOCIAL HOST LIABILITY IN WASH-
INGTON AFTER HANSEN v. FRIEND
Laura Hoexter
Abstract: In Hansen v. Friend, the Washington Supreme Court held that a host who fur-
nishes alcohol to a minor in a social setting is liable for all resulting injuries to the minor.
In reaching this result, the court limited the cause of action to minors, denying all third
parties injured by intoxicated minors a claim against social hosts. Additionally, the court
allowed intoxicated minors to bring an action for injuries resulting from any type of haz-
ard they encountered while intoxicated. This Note examines the Hansen decision and
proposes that, given the court's decision to impose civil liability upon hosts, the court
should extend a cause of action to third parties but limit liability to injuries resulting from
automobile accidents.
When fifteen-year-old Keith Hansen drowned in Lake Jameson
after drinking at a nearby campsite, his twenty-one-year-old compan-
ions faced liability for Hansen's wrongful death.' In Hansen v.
Friend, 2 the Washington Supreme Court held that as social hosts3 who
supplied liquor to a minor, both twenty-one-year-old companions may
be liable for the resulting death of their fifteen-year-old friend. This
decision is the first Washington case to hold social hosts liable for inju-
ries caused by serving alcohol.
This Note argues that the Hansen court arrived at its decision
through flawed analysis, and concludes that the court should apply
this holding only to cases where intoxicated minors injure themselves
or third parties in automobile accidents. Part I examines the develop-
ment of host liability in Washington and illustrates the court's reluc-
tance to impose liability on social hosts. Part II critically analyzes the
Washington Supreme Court's decision in Hansen on two grounds.
First, the court lacked legislative support to create a civil cause of
action against social hosts. Second, the court used faulty analysis to
find that the hosts owed a duty of care to Hansen because he was a
minor. Finally, this Note proposes that, given the court's decision to
create a civil cause of action, the legislature should intervene and limit
civil liability to hosts who serve minors who subsequently injure them-
selves or third parties in automobile accidents.
1. Hansen v. Friend, 118 Wash. 2d 476, 824 P.2d 483 (1992).
2. 118 Wash. 2d 476, 824 P.2d 483 (1992).
3. Social hosts are those who provide alcohol to others for no cost and with no future business
expectations. See Halvorson v. Birchfield Boiler, Inc., 76 Wash. 2d 759, 458 P.2d 897 (1969).
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I. EXAMINATION OF SOCIAL HOST LIABILITY IN
WASHINGTON
A. Legislative Enactments
Two types of legislative enactments give rise to host liability: dram-
shop acts and alcoholic beverage control (ABC) acts.' Dramshop acts
impose civil liability upon commercial hosts5 who furnish liquor to
consumers who later injure themselves or others. Although dramshop
acts vary between states, dramshop liability in most jurisdictions does
not extend to social hosts.6 Similarly, ABC acts regulate the distribu-
tion or sale of intoxicating liquor to individuals who pose a potentially
high risk of danger to the general public.7 ABC acts, however, apply
to both commercial and social hosts. While violations of ABC statutes
are criminal misdemeanor offenses,8 courts have recently relied on
these criminal statutes to impose civil liability for injuries caused by an
intoxicated person served in violation of an ABC act.9
1. Dramshop Acts
Dramshop acts first appeared in the Prohibition era.1 ° Prohibition-
ists lobbied state legislatures to enact dramshop acts in order to con-
trol liquor traffic and protect against the "evils" of intoxicating
liquor."1 Due to these efforts, legislatures passed statutes that imposed
civil liability on suppliers for damages caused by persons to whom
they supplied liquor. 2 Prohibitionists' efforts 3 were fully realized
when the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution was ratified in
1919, establishing Prohibition.
1 4
4. Carla K. Smith, Note, Social Host Liability for Injuries Caused by the Acts of an
Intoxicated Guest, 59 N.D. L. REv. 445, 446-47 (1983).
5. Commercial hosts are those who sell alcohol. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 66.04.010
(West 1985).
6. For cases refusing to extend liability to social hosts, see Smith, supra note 4, at 455 n.99.
7. Id. at 459. For a complete list of state statutes, see Mary M. French et al., Special Project,
Social Host Liability for the Negligent Acts of Intoxicated Guests, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 1058,
1076 n.135 (1985).
8. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 66.44.180, .300 (West 1985); see also Smith, supra
note 4, at 459.
9. See, eg., Baughn v. Malone, 33 Wash. App. 592, 656 P.2d 1118 (1983).
10. In the 1830s, prohibitionists abandoned the belief that individud drinkers would reform
themselves and turned to the state legislatures in an attempt to cut off the liquor supply to the
general public. Smith, supra note 4, at 448.
11. Id. at 448-49.
12. Id. at 449.
13. For a discussion of the temperance movement, see 9 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA
722-23 (15th ed. 1989).
14. The Eighteenth Amendment provides in part, "After one year from the ratification of this




In 1905, the Washington Legislature enacted its Dramshop Act. 5
This Act provided a civil cause of action to those injured by an intoxi-
cated person against anyone who provided liquor to the intoxicated
person.16 Before the legislature enacted the Dramshop Act, common
law did not impose civil liability upon those who furnished intoxicat-
ing liquor; courts considered such injuries too remote from the sale or
furnishing of the liquor to be actionable. 7 The Dramshop Act indoc-
trinated the causal link between the service of alcohol and the injury
upon which civil liability was based." The Dramshop Act not only
punished those who sold alcohol, but also provided a remedy to the
injured party where one generally did not exist under common law. 19
By providing such a remedy, the legislature articulated the causal con-
nection between the furnishing of alcohol and the resulting injury.
Additionally, the courts recognized this causality and interpreted the
Dramshop Act very liberally, applying it even to assaults by an intoxi-
cated person.20
2. Washington's Alcoholic Beverage Control Act
After Congress repealed Prohibition in 1933,21 many states repealed
their dramshop acts. 22 Washington followed suit, repealing its Dram-
shop Act in 1955.23 The Washington Legislature, however, subse-
quently passed the Washington Alcoholic Beverage Control (WABC)
thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the
jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited." U.S. CON T. amend. XVIII,
§ 1.
15. Dramshop Act, ch. 62, § 1, 1905 Wash. Laws 120 (repealed 1955).
16. The Dramshop Act provided:
Every husband, wife, child, parent, guardian, employe [sic], or other person who shall be
injured in person or property, or means of support, by any intoxicated person, or in
consequence of the intoxication, habitual or otherwise, of any person, shall have a right of
action, in his or her own name, severally or jointly, against any person or persons who shall,
by selling or giving intoxicating liquors, have caused the intoxication of such person, for all
damages sustained, and the same may be recovered in a civil action in any court of
competent jurisdiction.
Id.
17. French et al., supra note 7, at 1066.
18. Id.
19. Christen v. Lee, 113 Wash. 2d 479, 493, 780 P.2d 1307, 1313-14 (1989).
20. See, eg., Woodring v. Jacobino, 54 Wash. 504, 103 P. 809 (1909) (holding a drinking
establishment liable to a patron's estate where an intoxicated patron assaulted an individual, who
in self-defense killed the patron).
21. Congress repealed the Eighteenth Amendment by enacting the Twenty-first Amendment
in 1933. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1 ("The eighteenth article of amendment to the
Constitution of the United States is hereby repealed.").
22. French et al., supra note 7, at 1067.
23. Act of March 21, 1955, ch. 372, § 1, 1955 Wash. Laws 1538.
229
Washington Law Review
Act.24 This Act still exists today. In part, this Akct forbids selling
liquor to any person apparently under the influence of alcohol, 5 giv-
ing or otherwise supplying liquor to any minor,26 and selling intoxicat-
ing liquor to any minor.27 The legislature explicitly provided criminal
sanctions for violations of the WABC Act.28 The legislature remained
silent on the issue of civil penalties, however, neither expressly denying
nor permitting such a civil cause of action.29
a. The WABC Act Protects the Drinker as Well as Innocent Third
Parties
Historically, the courts interpreted as safety statutes those WABC
provisions barring the service of alcohol to those persons posing a
potentially high risk to the public.30 When interpreting the provision
barring the sale of alcohol to an obviously intoxicated person,31 the
Washington Supreme Court held that the provision provided both the
injured third party32 and the intoxicated person33 a cause of action
against the host.34 In essence, the WABC statute seeks to protect the
drinker as well as to promote public safety by giving both the drinker
and the third party a cause of action.
b. WABC Act Defines Minors as Those Under Twenty-One Years of
Age
In 1984, Congress signed the National Minimum Drinking Age
(NMDA) Act into law.35 This Act provided incentives for each state
to raise its minimum drinking age to a nationally uniform age of
twenty-one36 in an effort to reduce the disproportionate number of
24. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 66.04.010-.98.100 (West 1985 & Supp. 1992) (commonly
referred to as the Washington State Liquor Act).
25. Id. § 66.44.200 (West 1985).
26. Id. § 66.44.270 (West Supp. 1992).
27. Id. § 66.44.320 (West 1985).
28. See, e.g., id. § 66.44.180 (West Supp. 1992).
29. The dearth of legislative history on the WABC Act adds to courts' inability to ascertain
whether the legislature intended to allow a civil action.
30. The Washington Legislature passed the WABC Act to protect the "welfare, health, peace,
morals, and safety of the people of the state." WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 66.08.010 (West
1985).
31. Id. § 66.44.200.
32. See, e.g., Purchase v. Meyer, 108 Wash. 2d 220, 737 P.2d 661 (1987).
33. See, e.g., Young v. Caravan Corp., 99 Wash. 2d 655, 663 P.2d 834 (1983).
34. The courts treat this provision as a safety statute, especially in cases where the obviously
intoxicated person is a minor. See Purchase, 108 Wash. 2d at 220, 737 P.2d at 661.
35. 23 U.S.C. § 158 (1984).
36. Those states that did not comply faced a reduction in the highway funds allocated to them




drunk driving accidents among youths.37 Heeding Congress' recom-
mendation and incentives, states began to raise their drinking age to
twenty-one.3 8 In Washington, the WABC Act defines a minor as any-
one under the age of twenty-one. 39 Upon a challenge of age discrimi-
nation by those persons over the age of majority (eighteen) yet under
twenty-one, the Washington Supreme Court in Houser v. State'
upheld the twenty-one-year-old age restriction finding that a rational
relationship exists between the regulation of liquor and drunk driv-
ing.a t Thus, Washington and Congress explicitly recognize that those
persons ordinarily considered adults for most purposes, may be pro-
hibited from consuming alcohol for the sole purpose of preventing
drunk driving.
B. Judicially Created Civil Liability in Washington
Since the repeal of the Dramshop Act, the Washington courts have
denied intoxicated persons and parties injured by intoxicated persons a
cause of action against the liquor supplier, despite the supplier's illegal
actions.42 While following the general common law rule of non-liabil-
Minimum Drinking Age Act of 1984: Once Again Congress Mails Home Another Fist, 34 CLEV.
ST. L. REv. 637, 639 n.l1 (1985-86).
37. H.R. REP. No. 606, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1984). The purpose of the NMDA Act was
to save lives of Americans who travel on highways and, in particular, to alleviate the
disproportionate number of fatal accidents among young people each year. Id. at 2-4.
38. Prior to 1971, when the voting age in the United States was 21, many states set a
minimum drinking age at 21. When the Twenty-sixth Amendment lowered the national voting
age to 18 in 1971, several states also reduced the age of majority for most purposes to 18.
Kadlec, supra note 36, at 637. These states believed that if 18- to 20-year-olds could "vote [in
national elections], marry, and serve in the armed forces, they were old enough to drink
responsibly." Id. Accordingly, these states lowered their drinking age to 18. Id. Washington,
however, maintained its drinking age at 21. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.28.080 (West
1985).
39. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 66.44.270 (West Supp. 1992) (prohibiting the giving, or
otherwise supplying, of alcohol to anyone under the age of 21); id. § 66.44.300 (prohibiting the
selling of alcohol to anyone under the age of 21).
40. 85 Wash. 2d 803, 540 P.2d 412 (1975), overruled on other grounds, State v. Smith, 93
Wash. 2d 329, 610 P.2d 869, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 873 (1980).
41. Id. at 808-09, 540 P.2d at 415. The court found that the minimum drinking age
protected minors from the hazards of drunk driving. The plaintiff provided studies indicating
that (1) lowering the drinking age to 18 would not lead to increased alcohol consumption,
juvenile delinquency or alcoholism, and (2) persons between 18 and 20 are not less able to
consume alcohol in moderation than others. Id. at 808 n.7, 540 P.2d at 415 n.7. State agencies
offered evidence solely reflecting highway accident statistics: (1) a positive correlation between
youth and drinking and traffic accidents, (2) a greater incidence of accidents in states where the
drinking age has been lowered, and (3) increased vulnerability of 18- to 20-year-olds to traffic
accidents at a given blood alcohol level. Id. at 808 nn.6-7, 540 P.2d at 415 nn.6-7.
42. Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wash. 2d 434, 437-38, 656 P.2d 1030, 1032 (1982); Halvorson v.
Birchfield Boiler, Inc., 76 Wash. 2d 759, 762, 458 P.2d 897, 899 (1969); Hulse v. Driver, 11
Wash. App. 509, 513, 524 P.2d 255, 258, review denied, 84 Wash. 2d 1011 (1974).
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ity,4 3 the Washington Supreme Court recognized exceptions in limited
situations: where the intoxicated person is (1) obviously intoxicated,
(2) in a state of helplessness, or (3) in a special relationship to the
furnisher of the intoxicant.' Only in these exceptional circumstances
has the court held commercial hosts civilly liable for violating the
WABC Act.45 The court has never held social hosts who serve adults
or minors liable to first parties46 or third parties,47 however, until Han-
sen v. Friend.
48
1. No Social Host Liability for Third Parties Injured by an
Intoxicated Adult or Minor
The Washington Supreme Court first barred third parties from
suing a social host for injuries caused by an intoxicated, able-bodied
adult guest in Halvorson v. Birchfield Boiler, Inc. 4" The Halvorson
court refused to hold a company liable when it furnished liquor to an
employee who later injured the plaintiff in an automobile accident."
The court based its holding on the common law rule that the con-
sumption-not the furnishing-of intoxicating liquor proximately
causes such injury.5 Thus, an injured third party had no cause of
action against a social host. Carving out an exception to this common
law rule, the court indicated a willingness to impose liability on those
persons who sold or gave liquor to an individual "in such a state of
helplessness or debauchery as to be deprived of h is will power or
responsibility for his behavior."52
Later, in Hulse v. Driver, 53 the court again faced a situation where a
plaintiff injured by an intoxicated driver brought suit against the social
host who served alcohol to the driver. The intoxicated driver in this
43. Halvorson, 76 Wash. 2d at 762, 458 P.2d at 899.
44. The Halvorson court created an exception for those persons in a "state of helplessness or
debauchery as to be deprived of [their] will power or responsibility for [tl'eir] behavior." Id. The
Wilson court later clarified these exceptions and expressed them as tle three categories. See
Wilson, 98 Wash. 2d at 438, 656 P.2d at 1032.
45. See, eg., Purchase v. Meyer, 108 Wash. 2d 220, 737 P.2d 661 (1987); Young v. Caravan
Corp., 99 Wash. 2d 655, 663 P.2d 834 (1983).
46. A first party is a person to whom the social host serves alcohol. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1122 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "party").
47. A third party is a person injured by one to whom the social host serves alcohol. See id. at
1479 (defining "third party").
48. 118 Wash. 2d 476, 824 P.2d 483 (1992).
49. 76 Wash. 2d 759, 458 P.2d 897 (1969).
50. Id. at 765, 458 P.2d at 900.
51. Id. at 762-65, 458 P.2d at 899-900.
52. Id. at 762, 458 P.2d at 900 (quoting 30 AM. JUR. Intoxicating Liquors § 520 (1958)).
53. 11 Wash. App. 509, 524 P.2d 255, review denied, 84 Wash. 2d 1011 (1974).
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case, however, was a minor.54  Applying Halvorson, the Hulse court
ruled that no cause of action exists against one who furnishes alcohol
to a minor in a social context.5 5 The court flatly stated that imposing
such liability should be a legislative decision.56 Thus, whether injured
by an intoxicated, able-bodied adult or minor guest, third parties could
not recover against a social host.
2. No Social Host Liability for Injuries to an Intoxicated Adult
The Washington Supreme Court addressed social host liability to an
injured first party in Burkhart v. Harrod.7 In Burkhart, the court
held that defendants who furnished alcohol to an adult in a social set-
ting were not liable as a matter of law, reiterating prior holdings that a
social host could not be liable for furnishing alcohol. 8 Additionally,
the court acknowledged that imposing social host liability was a legis-
lative decision, 59 not a judicial determination.60  The court opined that
imposing common law liability on social hosts would be unwise
because social hosts are not as capable of monitoring their guests' alco-
54. Id. at 510, 524 P.2d at 256-57.
55. Id. at 513-14, 524 P.2d at 258-59.
56. Id. at 514, 524 P.2d at 259 ("At present, there is no legislation imposing civil liability; if
such is to be imposed, it should be by legislative mandate.").
It may be that the social and economic consequences of 'mixing gasoline and liquor' should
lead to a rule of accountability by those who furnish intoxicants to one who becomes a tort-
feasor by reason of intoxication, but such a policy decision should be made by the legislature
after full investigation, debate and examination of the relative merits of the conflicting
positions.
Id. at 513-14, 524 P.2d at 258-59 (quoting Halvorson, 76 Wash. 2d at 765, 458 P.2d at 900)
(emphasis in Hulse).
57. 110 Wash. 2d 381, 755 P.2d 759 (1988). A string of cases preceding Burkhart all
addressed the Halvorson exception in a commercial or a quasi-commercial setting where the
person served was obviously intoxicated upon leaving the party or the tavern. See, eg.,
Dickinson v. Edwards, 105 Wash. 2d 457, 716 P.2d 814 (1986) (holding a quasi-commercial host
liable for serving alcohol to an obviously intoxicated adult); Young v. Caravan Corp., 99 Wash.
2d 655, 663 P.2d 834 (1983) (holding a commercial vendor liable for selling alcohol to an
obviously intoxicated minor); Halligan v. Pupo, 37 Wash. App. 84, 678 P.2d 1295 (1984)
(holding a quasi-commercial host liable for providing alcohol to an obviously intoxicated adult).
In each of these cases, the court avoided the question of social host liability, reserving "comment
on the potential liability of hosts in a purely social setting." Dickinson, 105 Wash. 2d at 466, 716
P.2d at 819.
58. Burkhart, 110 Wash. 2d at 384-85, 755 P.2d at 760.
59. Id. at 386, 755 P.2d at 761 ("If substantial financial liability is to be attached to the
hosting of a social gathering, heretofore considered an innocuous act, it should only be done after
careful consideration of all the effects on society and it should be imposed as a comprehensive
measure. The Legislature can do this, we cannot.").
60. Id. at 385, 755 P.2d at 761 ("The nature of the judicial role prevents us from capably
deciding the relative merits of social host liability.").
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hol consumption as their commercial and quasi-commercial 6' counter-
parts.62 Additionally, the court recognized that social host liability
has more wide-sweeping and unpredictable implications than commer-
cial host liability. Because social drinking touches most adults on a
frequent basis, a legally imposed responsibility on one party for
another's actions would strongly affect personal relationships.63 Thus,
the court declined to impose liability on social hosts for injuries to
intoxicated first party adults that result from the hosts' service.
3. Social Host Liability for Injuries to an Intoxicated Minor
The issue of social host liability for injuries to an intoxicated minor
remained unresolved until the court's recent decision in Hansen v.
Friend.64 Previously, a minor's estate raised this issue in Wilson v.
Steinbach.65 The Wilson court, however, dismissed the case on other
grounds, never reaching a conclusion on whether socf.al hosts are liable
for serving alcohol to a minor in violation of the WABC Act.66 Han-
sen v. Friend provided the court with an opportunity to finally address
the issue of social host liability for service to minors in Washington.
Deviating from the rule of non-liability, this case is the first to impose
liability on a social host.
C. Hansen v. Friend
In Hansen v. Friend, fifteen-year-old Keith Hansen fell into a lake
and drowned after consuming alcohol on a camping trip.67 His estate
subsequently brought suit against the two companions who furnished
the alcohol. 68  The Washington Court of Appeals found that the
defendants violated the WABC Act by serving a minor 69 but, adhering
61. The court defined quasi-commercial hosts as those hosts "who do not sell alcohol but who
otherwise had business interests in furnishing alcohol to their guests." Id. at 383-84, 755 P.2d at
760. See, e.g., Dickinson v. Edwards, 105 Wash. 2d 457, 716 P.2d 814 (1986) (finding that
hosting a holiday party as a corporate business deduction was an example of a quasi-commercial
setting, although this label was not used at that time).
62. Burkhart, 110 Wash. 2d at 386, 755 P.2d at 761. A person in the business of selling and
serving alcohol is usually better equipped to control patrons and has the financial capability and
incentive to do so. Id. (citing Settlemyer v. Wilmington Veterans Post 49, Am. Legion, Inc., 464
N.E.2d 521 (Ohio 1984)).
63. Id. at 386-87, 755 P.2d at 761-62.
64. 118 Wash. 2d 476, 824 P.2d 483 (1992).
65. 98 Wash. 2d 434, 656 P.2d 1030 (1982).
66. Id.
67. Hansen, 118 Wash. 2d at 478, 824 P.2d at 484.
68. Id.





to the Burkhart holding, the court refused to impose civil liability
upon the hosts.7" The Washington Supreme Court reversed the court
of appeals and held that civil liability may be imposed on hosts who
furnish alcohol in violation of the WABC Act.7
1. The Facts Surrounding Hansen v. Friend
In Hansen v. Friend, fifteen-year-old Keith Hansen stole liquor from
his parents' house and brought it to the house of twenty-one-year-old
Robert Friend where they drank the liquor together.72 The next
morning, when twenty-one-year-old Robert Petty arrived at Friend's
house, Friend and Hansen appeared visibly intoxicated. 73 Neverthe-
less, the three left for a fishing trip, stopping at a store where Petty
bought beer.74 At the campsite, Petty and Friend drank beer; whether
Hansen also drank at that point, however, is unclear. Petty soon
went to sleep, leaving Hansen unrestricted access to the beer at the
campsite.76 Later that evening Hansen and Friend, visibly and
severely intoxicated, entered another campsite to steal beer.77 Shortly
thereafter, Hansen went to yet another campsite to steal more beer.78
After nearby campers heard a loud splash, Petty and other campers
fruitlessly searched the lake for Hansen, but Hansen had drowned.79
Hansen's mother, as executrix of her son's estate, sued for the
wrongful death of her son, alleging that two adult social hosts negli-
gently furnished liquor to a minor, thereby causing his intoxication
and death.8 0 The court of appeals summarily dismissed the suit, hold-
ing that social hosts are not liable as a matter of law.8" On appeal, the
Washington Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case.
2
70. Id.
71. This was a close decision with only five justices voting to impose civil liability and four
opposing civil liability. Hansen v. Friend, 118 Wash. 2d 476, 824 P.2d 483 (1992).




76. Id. at 478-79, 824 P.2d at 484.
77. Id. at 479, 824 P.2d at 484.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 479, 824 P.2d at 484-85.
80. Id. at 478, 824 P.2d at 484.
81. Hansen v. Friend, 59 Wash. App. 236, 797 P.2d 521 (1990), rev'd, 118 Wash. 2d 476, 824
P.2d 483 (1992).
82. Hansen, 118 Wash. 2d at 478, 824 P.2d at 484.
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2. Washington Supreme Court Holding
The Hansen court held that social hosts have a civil duty not to
serve alcohol to minors. 3 While noting that no express legislative
intent to impose civil liability on a social host exists under the WABC
Act, the court nevertheless proceeded to infer intent from the Act
itself.84 Concluding that the legislature supports civil liability, the
court adopted the standard of care set out by the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts to define the duty of social hosts."
a. Legislative Intent
While conceding that the legislature did not expressly provide civil
penalties for violations of the WABC Act, the Hansen court nonethe-
less inferred such an intent to impose civil liability on social hosts.86
The only evidence of legislative intent regarding civil liability of social
hosts was the repeal of Washington's Dramshop ..Act.87 The court
stated that the repeal, in fact, emphasized the legislature's reluctance
to impose liability upon social hosts.88 Ignoring the reasons for repeal-
ing civil liability imposed by the Dramshop Act, the ourt nevertheless
inferred a legislative intent to impose civil liability from the legisla-
ture's imposition of criminal penalties.8 9 Noting that the WABC Act
specifically prohibits alcohol sales to minors,90 but not adults, 91 the
court distinguished Burkhart, which involved an adult plaintiff, from
Hansen, which involved a minor plaintiff.92 Based on this distinction,
the court allowed Hansen's estate to maintain an action against the
defendant social hosts, remanding the case to determine whether the
83. Id.
84. Id. at 482, 824 P.2d at 486; see supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965). The Hansen court was the first to
decide the social host issue using the evidence of negligence standard. Hansen, 118 Wash. 2d at
483, 824 P.2d at 486-87. Under the evidence of negligence standard, a jury may weigh the
statutory violation along with other relevant factors to determine liability. The defendant's
violation of a statutory duty, alone, is not conclusive of the defendant's negligence as under the
former negligence per se rule. In 1986, the legislature changed the standard from negligence per
se to evidence of negligence to eliminate the strict liability character of violations under the
negligence per se rule. See WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.40.050 (West 1985).
86. Hansen, 118 Wash. 2d at 482, 824 P.2d at 486.
87. Id. (citing Burkhart v. Harrod, 110 Wash 2d. 381, 755 P.2d 759 (1988)).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 66.44.270(1) (West Supp. 1992).
91. See Hansen, 118 Wash. 2d at 482, 824 P.2d at 486.
92. Id. Previously, in Burkhart, the court denied the existence of social host civil liability.




social hosts breached their duty of care and whether the breach proxi-
mately caused Hansen's injuries."
b. Washington Adopts the Restatement (Second) of Torts' Standard
for a Statutory Duty of Care
To establish a claim of negligence, a plaintiff must show the exist-
ence of a duty, a breach of this duty, a resulting injury, and causa-
tion-that the breach proximately caused the injury.9 4 At issue in
Hansen was whether Friend and Petty owed Hansen a duty of care.95
Whether one owes a duty of care to another is a question of law;96
legislation may prescribe this duty.
9 7
The Washington courts adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts'
four-part test to determine when the court may use a statute to define
a reasonable person's standard of conduct.9" Under the Restatement,
a statute may define a duty of care if that statute: (1) protects a class of
persons (2) against invasion of a particular interest (3) which results in
a specific kind of harm (4) through a particular hazard. 99 Only where
each of these factors is satisfied can a court use a statute as a basis for
defining conduct.
In Hansen, the court applied these factors to the WABC provision
that prohibits providing alcohol to minors"°° and concluded that a
social host owes a civil duty not to serve alcohol to minors."0 To
determine the first prong, the Hansen court consulted the definition of
"minor" under the WABC Act, which is any person under twenty-one
years of age.'0 2 Recognizing that this minimum age restriction was
not a random choice, but rather based on a justified state interest, 10 3
the court held that persons under twenty-one constituted a protected
class under the WABC Act.1°4
93. Hansen, 118 Wash. 2d at 486, 824 P.2d at 488.
94. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at
164-65 (5th ed. 1984).
95. Hansen, 118 Wash. 2d at 479, 824 P.2d at 485.
96. Id. (citing Pedroza v. Bryant, 101 Wash. 2d 226, 228, 677 P.2d 166, 168 (1984)).
97. Id. (citing Young v. Caravan Corp., 99 Wash. 2d 655, 659, 663 P.2d 834, 837 (1983)).
98. Id. at 479-80, 824 P.2d at 485 (citing Young, 99 Wash. 2d at 659-60, 663 P.2d at 837).
99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965).
100. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 66.44.270(1) (West Supp. 1992) is a criminal statute which
prohibits furnishing alcohol to minors. See supra notes 26, 28.
101. Hansen, 118 Wash. 2d at 481, 824 P.2d at 485-86.
102. See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text; see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 66.44.270(1) (West Supp. 1992).
103. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
104. Hansen, 118 Wash. 2d at 481, 824 P.2d at 485-86 (citing Houser v. State, 85 Wash. 2d
803, 808, 540 P.2d 412, 415 (1975), overruled on other grounds, State v. Smith, 93 Wash. 2d 329,
610 P.2d 869, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 873 (1980)).
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The court found the second prong of the Restatement test satisfied
because Hansen's health and safety interests were invaded by the
effects of alcohol." 5 The WABC Act's purpose is to protect the "wel-
fare, health, peace, morals, and safety of the people of the state."
°10 6
Particularly, the statute protects a minor's health and safety against
the minor's own inability to drink responsibly.107 Thus, this interest
was precisely the one which the statute was designed to protect. 108
The court found the third part of the Restatement test satisfied.
Specifically, the court recognized that restricting service of alcohol to
minors protects minors from physical harm caused by their abuse of
alcohol. 109 Because Hansen's intoxication resulted in physical harm to
himself, the court found the third requirement fulfilled. 1
Finally, the court found the fourth factor of the Restatement test
satisfied by concluding that the statute regulates the particular hazard
of "alcohol in the hands of minors.""'  Having established that the
statute satisfied the Restatement's four-part test, the court concluded
that the statute set forth an appropriate duty for social hosts." 2 The
court then remanded the case to determine the remaining elements of
negligence: breach, causation, and damages."'
II. CRITIQUE OF HANSEN
The Hansen court improperly imposed liability on all social hosts
who serve alcohol to minors who subsequently injure themselves.
First, the Hansen court improperly created a civil cause of action
against social hosts because the court lacked express legislative author-
ity. Second, the court drew erroneous conclusions from its application
of the Restatement test to define the duty owed by social hosts. The
court defined an unduly narrow, inflexible class that is protected by
the statute. Additionally, the court failed to limit the statute's applica-
tion to a narrowly defined hazard, thereby creating a broad range of
105. Id. at 481, 824 P.2d at 486.
106. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 66.08.010 (West 1985).
107. Hansen, 118 Wash. 2d at 481, 824 P.2d at 486 (citing Callan v O'Neil, 20 Wash. App.




111. Id. at 482, 824 P.2d at 486.
112. Id.
113. The court also remanded the case to determine the extent of Hansen's contributory
negligence. Id. at 486, 824 P.2d at 488. Contributory negligence arises when a plaintiff's
conduct is below the standard to which the plaintiff is legally required to conform for the
plaintiff's own protection and which is a contributing cause of the plaintiff's harm. See BLACK'S




actionable risks. Given the court's predispostion to allow civil liabil-
ity, the court should properly apply the Restatement test, thereby
expanding the protected class to include third parties injured by intox-
icated minors and restricting the hazard to a narrowly defined risk
such as drunk driving.
A. The Court Erroneously Inferred Legislative Intent
The WABC Act does not explicitly provide for civil liability."1
Despite this legislative silence, however, the Hansen court inferred a
civil duty not to serve minors. 5 This inference is unfounded and
problematic for several reasons. First, the legislature's silence evi-
denced an intent not to address the issue; because the legislature is
active on issues which concern drunk driving, it could have specifically
addressed such a related issue, but chose not to. 116 Second, inferring
intent to impose civil liability in the context of a statute imposing only
criminal liability is dangerous because criminal statutes are not scruti-
nized as closely before passage,11 7 some criminal statutes rely on
prosecutorial discretion for their enforcement, 8 and overpunishment
may result from imposing civil liability in addition to existing criminal
penalties. 19 The legislature abolished civil liability with the repeal of
the Dramshop Act and, without any evidence that the criminal penal-
114. See supra text accompanying note 29.
115. Hansen, 118 Wash. 2d at 482, 824 P.2d at 486. See generally Charles L.B. Lowndes,
Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation, 16 MINN. L. REV. 361, 363-64 (1932).
116. Several recent bills have addressed drunk driving, including: a statute which changes the
crime of driving while intoxicated to a broader crime of driving while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor or any drug, Act of May 21, 1991, 1991 Wash. Laws 290; a proposal to
authorize the revocation of driving privileges for violation of drug and alcohol laws, H.R. 2097,
52d Leg., Reg. Sess. (1991); a proposal to allow punitive damages for injury or wrongful death
from driving while intoxicated, H.R. 1676, 52d Leg., Reg. Sess. (1991); and a proposal to change
the blood and breath alcohol content standard of intoxication for those persons under the age of
21, S. 5069, 52d Leg., Reg. Sess. (1991).
117. Many criminal statutes are ill-conceived, hastily drawn without adequate investigation,
or obsolete. In these criminal statutes, the legislature fails to address the standard of due care
necessary in civil suits or set out standards within the statute by which to judge a negligence
action. Bauman v. Crawford, 104 Wash. 2d 241, 252, 704 P.2d 1181, 1188 (1985).
118. Enforcement officials exercise discretion when enforcing criminal statutes in situations
where literal compliance makes no sense or presents hardship. In civil actions, however, where
large damages are often at stake, the injured party is less forgiving and will not jeopardize his
claim because of the defendant's hardship. Id. at 253, 704 P.2d at 1188.
119. Overpunishment occurs particularly where a statute imposes criminal liability to
penalize and discourage violations of the law. By imposing monetary compensation in addition
to the criminal penalty, a court essentially increases the penalty upon the host without legislative
approval. See Clarence Morris, The Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort Liability, 46 HARV. L.
REV. 453, 469-70 (1932-33).
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ties for violation of the WABC Act are inadequate, the court should
not have inferred legislative intent from a criminal statute.
Moreover, by inferring intent, the court went beyond its judicial
function and improperly usurped legislative power. Traditionally, the
Washington Supreme Court has remained within its judicial role, fol-
lowing the common law rule of non-liability for social and commercial
hosts, subject only to certain exceptions.' 20 The court has repeatedly
refused to broaden these exceptions without legislative mandate.' 2 '
The court should have deferred the issue of social host liability to the
legislature which is better equipped to decide broad public policy
issues and weigh societal interests.
22
B. The Hansen Court Drew Faulty Conclusions from the
Restatement Test
The Hansen court used faulty reasoning to arrive at its conclusion
that social hosts are civilly liable for minors' injuries. Particularly, the
court misapplied the Restatement's four-part test123 to determine
whether the statute that prohibits providing alcohol to minors
prescribes a standard of conduct for social hosts. The Hansen court
misapplied two factors of the test: the protected class and the particu-
120. These exceptions are set forth in Halvorson v. Birchfield Boiler, Inc., 76 Wash. 2d 759,
458 P.2d 897 (1969). See supra note 44 and text accompanying note 52.
121. See supra part I.B; see also Burkhart v. Harrod, 110 Wash. 2- 381, 388, 755 P.2d 759,
762 (1988) (declining to extend liability to social hosts, deeming the legislature the appropriate
body to address such changes in the law); Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wash. 2d 434, 441, 656 P.2d
1030, 1034 (1982) (declining to extend the recognized exceptions to include the imposition of a
common law duty on a social host for furnishing intoxicating liquor to a minor); Shelby v. Keck,
85 Wash. 2d 911, 915-17, 541 P.2d 365, 369-70 (1975) (declining to alter the exceptions, stating
that to do so would be to "adopt a theory of strict liability to be applied against one who
furnishes liquor whenever a patron commits a tort while intoxicated").
122. Evaluating the overall merits of social host liability, with its impact on society and
personal relationships, requires balancing the costs and benefits for society as a whole, not just
the parties of any one case. While courts are limited to reviewing only evidence pertaining to the
facts of a particular case and focusing on particular individuals, the legislature is uniquely able to
hold hearings, gather crucial information, and learn the full extent of the competing societal
interests. The legislature can take time to investigate a wide range of issues that are not before
the court in any given case. Thus, in the context of social host liability, committees can
investigate the amount of damage caused by drunk drivers, the percentage of that damage for
which a social host was responsible, the extent to which automobile insurance of all types already
provides a remedy to victims, the effect that the added liability would have on homeowners' and
renters' insurance rates, the possibilities of alternative remedies such, as having drunk drivers
contribute to a statewide fund for victims, the possibilities of limiting the host's liability, and
prescribing standards of conduct for social hosts. Burkhart, 110 Wash. 2d at 385-86, 755 P.2d at
761.
123. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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lar hazard.124 The court's definition of the protected class was too
inflexible and too narrow. Additionally, the court's definition of the
particular hazard was too broad, allowing injury from any type of haz-
ard to be actionable.
L The Court Created an Inflexible and Narrowly Defined Protected
Class
In defining the class protected by the statute,1 25 the Hansen court
enunciated an inflexible and narrow class. By defining the protected
class as "minors," the court granted to all those persons under twenty-
one, regardless of maturity level, a cause of action against a social
host. Additionally, by limiting the protected class to minors, the court
denied recovery to third parties injured by the intoxicated minor. The
court should expand its definition of the protected class to account for
a minor's maturity level as well as grant a cause of action to third
parties injured by intoxicated minors.
The Hansen court's definition of protected class is too inflexible
because it focuses solely on the minor's age. The court defined the
protected class as all persons under twenty-one years of age. 2 6 This
age limit ignores the minor's level of maturity, a factor that courts
generally consider. 27 Ignoring a minor's maturity level is inconsistent
with tort principles that permit courts to treat mature seventeen- to
twenty-year-olds according to adult standards. To say, as the court
does in Hansen, that selling alcohol to a minor of any age in violation
124. The Restatement requires that the statute protect a specific class of persons against
invasion of a particular interest which results in a specific kind of harm through a particular
hazard. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
125. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 66.44.270(1) (West Supp. 1992) (prohibiting furnishing
alcohol to persons under age 21).
126. Hansen v. Friend, 118 Wash. 2d 476, 482, 824 P.2d 483, 486 (1992).
127. Washington applies a special standard of care to children aged 6 to 16; the court
measures a child's conduct by the conduct of a reasonably careful child of the same age,
intelligence, maturity, training, and experience. Bauman v. Crawford, 104 Wash. 2d 241, 244,
704 P.2d 1181, 1184 (1985). Moreover, the court may treat a 17- or 18-year-old of normal
capacity as an adult. See Dingwail v. McKerricher, 75 Wash. 2d 352, 355, 450 P.2d 947, 948
(1969) (allowing a defendant to enforce a special child standard, the court stated that "A
seventeen-year-old plaintiff is presumed to have sufficient capacity to understand and avoid a
clear danger. . . .") (quoting Burgess v. Mattox, 132 S.E.2d 577, 578 (N.C. 1963)); Colwell v.
Nygaard, 8 Wash. 2d 462, 476, 112 P.2d 838, 844 (1941) (recognizing that persons 18 years of
age should exercise the same judgment and discretion in caring for their own safety as persons
more advanced in years). Thus, the special child standard turns on maturity and capacity to
appreciate dangers rather than merely the child's age. Bauman, 104 Wash. 2d at 244, 704 P.2d
at 1184; see also Dingwall, 75 Wash. 2d at 355, 450 P.2d at 948 (holding that a person's minority




of the statute is sufficient to impose civil liability without accounting
for the minor's level of maturity, contradicts this special child
standard.
In deciding whether Petty and Friend were liable for furnishing
Hansen with alcohol, the court should have first ascertained Hansen's
level of maturity instead of considering just his age. Although the
Hansen outcome may not have been affected, the court's failure to rec-
ognize this standard may unjustly penalize a future host who serves a
minor, seventeen or older, acting as an adult.12 Thus, deciding at the
outset whether the minor was acting in the capacity of an adult is a
crucial determination for the court.
The court's definition of protected class is too narrow because it
precludes recovery by third parties injured by intoxicated minors. The
court has continually recognized that the WABC Act seeks to protect
the drinker as well as to promote public safety by giving both the
drinker and the third party a cause of action against a host. 129 Deny-
ing third party recovery is therefore inconsistent with the aim of the
WABC Act because it does not protect third parties. Additionally,
denying third party recovery leads to an anomolous result, denying the
only true innocent victim a cause of action. The court should have
allowed third parties to recover, further encouraging social hosts not
to serve minors in order to ensure public safety-the goal of the
WABC Act.
130
By defining the protected class as "minors," the Hansen court limits
recovery to intoxicated minors injured by their own actions. Given its
decision to impose liability on social hosts, the court should allow all
of those injured by the social host's act of serving alcohol to recover
against the host. Allowing first and third parties to recover is consis-
tent with prior interpretations of the WABC Act holding that it is a
safety statute.1 31 Thus, by unduly restricting the protected class of
this statute, the Hansen court abandoned the aim of the WABC Act
and denied third parties recovery against a social host.
128. To enforce such a restriction regardless of maturity level may strain personal
relationships by making one person responsible for another's actions. This holding would have
potentially devastating results if applied to a case with facts similar to Wilson v. Steinbach, 98
Wash. 2d 434, 656 P.2d 1030 (1982), where a 19-year-old bride was drinking alcohol at a holiday
party hosted by her future in-laws. It would be unreasonable to make the host responsible for the
bride's actions if the bride chooses to drink. Thus, the minor's maturity level should be
considered when determining whether she lacks the capacity to use adult judgment.
129. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 30.
131. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, the Hansen court's decision denying recovery to third
parties leads to an anomolous result. Courts that recognize social host
liability often do so to fully compensate innocent victims and to pre-
vent persons from drinking and driving. These courts reason that full
compensation and deterrence are worth the cost of chilling social
activity. 132 Many proponents of social host liability advocate its impo-
sition only in cases of third party injuries 133 because third parties are
the only true innocent victims.' 34  The Hansen decision, however,
denies third parties this very remedy. Because the court chose to
impose civil liability on social hosts for serving alcohol to minors, it
should apply the rule consistently to all injured plaintiffs by expanding
the Hansen definition of the protected class to allow third parties
injured by an intoxicated minor to recover.
2. The Court's Definition of the Particular Hazard Is Too Broad
The Hansen court also reached a faulty conclusion in specifying the
particular hazard that caused the harm. 135 The Hansen court broadly
defined the particular hazard to be "alcohol in the hands of minors,"
contrary to the Restatement's requirement that the hazard be nar-
rowly restricted. 136 The court's broad interpretation encompasses a
large range of potential risks, including those risks which the court has
previously excluded.
137
The Hansen court's unrestricted definition of the particular hazard
as "alcohol in the hands of minors" does not provide adequate gui-
dance for social hosts. Such a broadly defined hazard would encom-
pass anything that occurs as a result of a minor's drinking. Thus, a
minor could conceivably have a cause of action against a host for any
slight injury, ranging from a chipped tooth to a hangover. The Han-
132. See Hilary R. Weinert, Social Hosts and Drunken Drivers: A Duty to Intervene?, 133 U.
PA. L. REv. 867, 872-73 (1985).
133. Id. at 872 ("Mhe lesser blameworthiness of the host dictates that we should impose
liability on the host, if at all, only for injuries to innocent victims and not for injuries sustained by
the drunken driver herself.... [l]t seems obvious that [the driver] should not be able to recover
against the secondarily responsible host."); see also Mary H. Seminara, When the Party's over:
McGuiggan v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Co. and the Emergence of a Social Host
Liability Standard in Massachusetts, 68 B.U. L. REV. 193, 206 (1988).
134. Minors are prohibited from drinking, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 66.44.270(2) (West
Supp. 1992), and drinking and driving is illegal, id. § 46.61.502; therefore, minors are not
innocent victims. Similarly, because the host has illegally supplied alcohol to the minor, the host
is not an innocent party. Id. § 66.44.270(1).
135. See supra text accompanying note 111.
136. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) or TORTS § 286 cmt. i (1965).
137. See, e.g., Christen v. Lee, 113 Wash. 2d 479, 780 P.2d 1307 (1989) (holding that statutes
prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquor to one who appears intoxicated or who is a minor are
not intended to protect against the particular hazard of a subsequent criminal assault).
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sen court most likely did not intend such absurd :results. Applying
such a broad hazard standard would also result in allowing minors to
pursue an action for all torts that the minor committed while the
minor was intoxicated. Such a result is contrary to earlier Washington
cases that declined to impose liability when an intoxicated minor
intentionally injured a third party.1 38 Thus, the court's definition of
the specific hazard as "alcohol in the hands of minors" was not a suffi-
ciently restricted hazard. 139 This interpretation, therefore, provides
no guidance to a judge for determining the types of risks the statute
seeks to protect against as a matter of law.
3. The Court Should Redefine the Particular Hazard
The court should impose liability on social hosts only when intoxi-
cation is accompanied by an act that becomes proportionately more
dangerous when performed while intoxicated. 1" Justice Utter, con-
curring in Burkhart, hinted that a finding of more than just furnishing
alcohol to minors might be necessary before liability attaches."' He
proposed a list of factors to consider in determining whether hosts
have satisfied the duty of care toward their guests.142 Specifically, Jus-
tice Utter would consider whether the host (1) provided the alcohol to
an obviously intoxicated guest, (2) knew or had reason to know that
the guest would drive away from the host's premises, and (3) took
reasonable steps to deter the guest from driving, including offering
alternative means of transportation, a place to stay until no longer
impaired, or money for a taxi.143 Consideration of these factors sug-
gests that a host breaches a duty of care not only by supplying alcohol
to an intoxicated guest, but by supplying alcohol and failing to take
reasonable steps to bar the door thereafter. 1" Essentially, Justice
138. See id.
139. Furthermore, if this particular hazard were applied literally, a minor would be in a
hazardous situation when merely holding alcohol. Yet, minors over 18 may act as servers or
bartenders. They are permitted under the WABC Act to carry and sell beer in certain
establishments. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 66.44.340-.350 (West Supp. 1992). Because
the WABC Act allows some minors to handle alcohol, "alcohol in the hands of minors" cannot
be the specific hazard the WABC Act seeks to prevent.
140. See Burkhart v. Harrod, 110 Wash. 2d 381, 391, 755 P.2d 759, 764 (1988) (Utter, J.,
concurring).
141. Id. at 399, 755 P.2d at 768 (There is "justice in compensating victims injured or killed as
a proximate result of hosts serving truly obviously intoxicated guests alcohol and then failing to
deter their driving on public road&") (emphasis added).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See Theresa 3. Rambosek, A Wavering Line? Washington's Rules of Liability for




Utter argues that to avoid liability, a host must monitor his guests to
prevent them from driving or from engaging in some other specified,
dangerous act after the guest becomes intoxicated. 4 ' The Hansen
court, however, failed to enunciate such specific guidelines and pro-
scribed no particular act against which social hosts are to protect.
Congress recognizes drunk driving as the hazard against which per-
sons eighteen- to twenty-years-old should be protected. When Con-
gress suggested a minimum drinking age of twenty-one in the NMDA
Act, it defined drunk driving as the only acceptable hazard for denying
alcohol to those persons eighteen to twenty years of age. 146 Thus,
eighteen- to twenty-year-olds are only protected from the hazard of
drunk driving.
Washington should adopt drunk driving as the standard hazard for
all minors. Adopting this standard would be advantageous for the
courts, social hosts, and minors. It would promote judicial economy
by allowing recovery only for injuries resulting from a specific
occurance-auto accidents. Drunk driving accidents are the most fre-
quent accidents involving alcohol among minors. Adopting drunk
driving as the standard would limit recovery to the largest cause of
accidents resulting in serious bodily harm to minors as well as mem-
bers of the public. At the same time, this standard would deny law-
suits over hangovers or death from intoxication. Additionally, by
adopting drunk driving as the hazard, the court need not apply two
separate hazard standards-drunk driving for those over eighteen and
"alcohol in the hands of minors" for those under eighteen.147 Thus,
the distinction between minors under eighteen and those over eighteen
becomes irrelevant. This rule would help social hosts avoid lawsuits
by providing more guidance and more clearly defined social host
duties. Such a rule would also protect minors by proscribing the haz-
145. Id.
146. Congress may impose an age restriction over the age of majority (18) only if it is
rationally related to a significant state interest; otherwise, the age distinction will violate equal
protection laws by unfairly burderning a specific age group. In the NMDA Act, Congress
mandated a minimum drinking age of 21. The state interest articulated in the NMDA Act was
to protect those persons between the ages of 18 and 20 from drunk driving accidents. The
Washington Supreme Court upheld the need to protect this class from auto accidents as a valid
state interest. See Houser v. State, 85 Wash. 2d 803, 540 P.2d 412 (1975), overruled on other
grounds, State v. Smith, 93 Wash. 2d 329, 610 P.2d 869, cert denied, 449 U.S. 873 (1980).
147. The court may only impose liability on a social host who serves a person 18- to 20-years-
old when this person is injured in an automobile accident. See supra notes 40-41 and
accompanying text. Under Hansen, a court may impose liability on a social host who serves a
person under 18 when this person is injured by any hazard. By limiting the Hansen decision to
only protect against injuries resulting from automobile accidents, the court can eliminate the
need to distinguish between those over 18 and those under 18.
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ard that produces the most injuries to minors-drunk driving. In
essence, this rule would fulfill the purpose of the WABC Act-to pro-
tect the "welfare, health, peace, morals, and safety of the people of the
state."
148
Moreover, numerous other jurisdictions have adopted drunk driving
as the protected hazard. 149 These courts stress that the only rational
purpose for imposing social host liability is to prevent drunk driv-
ing.15° By holding social hosts liable only when t:ey serve a minor
who becomes intoxicated, drives an automobile, and causes an injury-
producing accident, these jurisdictions provide a predictable and lim-
ited set of circumstances where the courts will impose liability as a
matter of law.
Given the court's reluctance in Hansen to limit this hazard, the leg-
islature should act to prevent courts from imposing liability for risks
other than drunk driving. The legislature should also expand the pro-
tected class to include innocent third parties injured by intoxicated
minors as well as the intoxicated minors. Expanding the class would
satisfy the purpose of civil liability-to provide compensation to all
victims. The legislature should, therefore, explictly provide for third
party recovery against a social host who serves a minor. Under this
interpretation of protected class and specific hazard, Friend and Petty,
the two twenty-one-year-old friends of Hansen, could not have been
liable for Hansen's death. Instead, liability would attach only where a
social host knew an intoxicated minor was driving away from a host's
premises yet failed to take steps to prevent the minor from leaving.
III. CONCLUSION
In Hansen v. Friend, the court chose to follow the national trend
and impose liability on social hosts who serve alcohol to minors.
Instead of granting a cause of action to anyone harmed from a social
host's illegal service to minors, the court limited standing to only the
intoxicated minor. Additionally, the court allowed these minors to
recover for injuries arising from a wide range of risks.
Given the court's decision to create a civil cause cf action, the court
should redefine these standards. The court should extend the pro-
tected class to encompass all persons injured as a consequence of the
148. See supra note 30.
149. See Cravens v. Inman, 586 N.E.2d 367, 374-75 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (listing 24 states that
impose liability in this situation).
150. See Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219, 1226 (N.J. 1984); Dickinson v. Edwards, 105




social host's illegal actions, whether it is the minor or a third party
injured by an intoxicated minor. However, the court should impose
liability only when intoxication accompanies a specific dangerous act.
Because most injuries involving intoxication result from automobile
accidents, the court should limit social host liability to injuries result-
ing from drunk driving.
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